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CULTURE WARS:
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL MONUMENTS IN A HUMAN RIGHTS
CONTEXT
By: Kruti J. Patel
I. INTRODUCTION
A nation’s internal conflicts are often about cultural supremacy. Conflicts between
cultures are far more dangerous than conflicts between states because, while states understand
the language of diplomacy, parties involved in a cultural conflict often do not. Many times the
differences between cultural blocks in a nation are so strong that they prevent any negotiations
towards a truce. Fueled by a fundamentalist mindset, conflicts between different cultural groups
frequently become deadly and destructive, often because the goal of the conflict is to attain
victory by eradicating of the conflicting culture. Ultimately, many culture wars are about
creating a homogeneous national identity.
Attacking the physical manifestations of the conflicting culture is one of the most
tempting tools of cultural warfare. 1 While civil wars, like the Kosovo war, provide a clear
example of cultural conflicts under international law, the more interesting and difficult
situations do not rise to the level of civil wars, such as the Babri Mosque Riots in India, or the
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan. With respect to the protection of culture
objects, international law is at its weakest where hostilities do not rise to the level of civil war.
International law recognizes the importance of protecting cultural property as both the
heritage of a specific group and of all humankind. 2 However, the driving force behind the major
international cultural property preservation and protection agreements is the idea thatcultural
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property is the “inheritance of all human kind.” 3 Brennan, in her note on the Bamiyan Buddha
situation, explains this motivation as follows:
Cultural property is our inheritance from the past, our cultural heritage. It
explains who we are and where we come from. The world values cultural
property because it forms social identity and, in some instances, embodies the
highest accomplishments of the human spirit. International laws that seek to
protect cultural property reflect these values. 4
For the above stated reasons, many existing treaties recognize the need to protect cultural
property in situations of “armed conflict” and in times of peace. The 1954 Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 5 (“Hague Convention of
1954”), and its two subsequent protocols signed in 1954 (“First Protocol”) and 1999 (“Second
Protocol”) 6 is a major treaty dealing with the protection of cultural property. 7 Other major
treaties include the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 8 (“UNESCO
Convention”), and the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage 9 (“World Heritage Convention”). If every member nation was in perfect conformity
with the specific treaty provisions of the UNESCO, Hague, and World Heritage Conventions,
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cultural property in all member nations would be adequately protected during international
armed conflict, conflicts not of an international character, and in times of peace. However, for
many reasons, that is not the case.
International law requires states to voluntarily bind themselves to negotiated pacts; yet,
even within these negotiated documents, there are loopholes that allow for the commission of
prohibited conduct while circumventing the consequences of said behavior. The law is
especially weak when it comes to obligating member states to protect their own cultural
property through domestic legislation. 10 Two relatively recent events in world history show the
glaring need for additional protection of cultural property, and display the ways in which the
Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention, and the World Heritage Convention fail in these
types of instances. The destruction of the Babri Mosque in India and the demolition of the
Bamiyan Buddhas both provide good examples of situations where international law failed not
only to prevent, but also to sanction nations for their failure to abide by their international
obligations, duties, and responsibilities toward all of humankind.
While adjusting the existing law to close the loopholes in international pacts may resolve
the problems to a degree, the philosophy that drives these laws needs to be adjusted to better
protect cultural property. Moving from a cultural internationalist approach towards a more
individualized human rights based approach in the protection of cultural property will provide a
better basis for creating sanctions against those responsible for the destruction of cultural
property. Part II of this note reviews the possible protection encoded within the current
international law regime comprised of The Hague and its Protocols and the World Heritage
Convention. Part III discusses the historical context in which the treaties were created to
provide an illustrative aid for the discussion in Part IV, which appraises the shortcomings of the
10
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current international law regime protecting cultural property. Part V concludes that developing a
human rights based regime as the basis for the protection of cultural property is necessary to
close the loopholes of current law and correct its failures.
II. TREATIES IN FORCE
A. Hague Convention of 1954
The Hague Convention of 1954 is the first international treaty dealing exclusively with
the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. The specific articles of interest
for the purposes of this discussion are Articles Three, Eighteen, and Nineteen.
Article Eighteen provides one of the basic assumptions of the convention: except for specific
peace-time provisions, the treaty provisions go into effect during times of declared war or armed
conflict between two or more contracting parties, or when there is a belligerent occupation of
one member state by other member states. 11 This basic assumption makes perfect sense in light
of the era of history that produced the Convention. Post World War II, the largest concern was
the threat of another large-scale war between many states , and the treaty reflects this fear by
focusing on armed or war-like conflicts between two or more nations.
Fundamentally, the Hague Convention of 1954 was created to function in another
“world-war” type of situation; however, it still covered other types of scenarios. Article Three,
one of the few peacetime provisions of the Hague, provides: “[t]he High Contracting Parties
undertake to prepare in time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within
their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict, by taking such measures
as they consider appropriate.” 12

11
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Hague Convention of 1954, supra note 5, at art. 3.
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Article Nineteen supplies the most interesting and controversial provisions of the Hague.
The article provides in pertinent part: “[i]n the event of an armed conflict not of an international
character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which
relate to respect for cultural property.” 13 This language was adopted from the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. 14 This article offers guidance on determining what constitutes an armed
conflict not of an international character. The Commentaries on the 1949 Geneva Conventions
provide several factors that, while not exhaustive, are determinative. 15 These factors include: (1)
whether the party in revolt [against the de jure or actual government] possesses an organized
military force, an authority responsible for its acts, and possess any means to ensure compliance
to the Convention; (2) whether the legal government is obliged to use its regular military forces
against insurgents organized as military in possession of the national territory; (3) whether the
de jure government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents or has claimed belligerent
rights; (4) whether the insurgents are organized as a state would be, and has de facto control
over the national territory; and, finally, (5) whether the internal dispute as been submitted to the
United Nations Security Counsel or the General Assembly of the United Nations as a threat to
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. 16
For the purposes of Article Nineteen, the obligations to respect cultural property apply to
“each party” of the conflict, whereas, traditionally, international obligations only applied to
contracting states. Therefore, Article Nineteen obligates not only member states, but also
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individual citizens of those member states. 17 Chamberlain, in his explanation of Article
Nineteen states:
The obligation extends not only to the contracting party in whose
territory the conflict is taking place, who may be the de jure
government, but also to insurgents engaged in conflict either with
the de jure government or among themselves. This raises the question
as to how an entity that is not a State can be bound by the Convention.
. . . In case of an internal conflict a Contracting State may be
powerless to prevent violations of the Convention by insurgent forces.
But this does not mean that the State is absolved of any responsibility
for the duty to prevent further violations and to bring to justice those
responsible for the violations of the Convention. 18
Article Three obligates the member nations to protect their own cultural property during
times of peace, if they desire protection for it during times of war. Article Nineteen, on the other
hand, requires member nations to protect their cultural property during any armed conflict that is
not of an international character, such as civil war. As mentioned above, the weakest point of
the Convention is that it does not create explicit and compulsory obligations on the member
states to protect cultural property during times of peace, nor does it obligate member states to
protect cultural property from willful destruction during conflicts that do not rise to the level of
“armed conflict not of international character,” as described in the Hague Convention and the
Second Protocol. In short, situations like riots, and actions sanctioned by a bona fide
government during peacetimes, are simply not within the scope of the Convention. The
particular scope of the Hague was further elaborated on in the Second Protocol of 1999, which
is discussed below.
B. F irst and Second Protocols to the Hague Convention of 1954
At the 1954 Intergovernmental Conference, which drafted the Hague Convention, the
earlier versions were heavily criticized for being extremely focused on private law aspects of
17
18
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protection of cultural property during times of war. 19 Many delegations suggested that aspects of
public law should be considered; however, the Hague was passed without the incorporation of
such suggestions. Ultimately, another protocol would be created under which public law
concerns would be addressed. 20
The First Protocol, which supplements the Hague Convention of 1954, is comprised of
three parts. The first part is concerned with the return of property exported from occupied
territories. The second part deals with the return of property from one party to another when a
party has removed cultural objects for safekeeping. 21 The third part of the First Protocol mainly
deals with housekeeping matters and is unique to this Protocol because it allows the parties to
accept the Protocol in its entirety, or to accept only Parts I or II. 22
By the early 1990’s, the effectiveness of the Hague Convention was greatly questioned,
mainly due to the vast damage to cultural property during the Second Gulf War, and the war in
the former Yugoslavia. 23 As a result of multiple international reviews on the validity and
effectiveness of the 1954 Hague Convention and the First Protocol, a diplomatic conference to
create a second protocol took place in 1999. Soon thereafter, the Second Protocol was adopted
at Hague. The purpose of the Second Protocol, apart from introducing some new elements
concerning the protection of cultural property, was to provide greater precision to the more
vague provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention. The scope of the Hague and the situations to
which it applied were not defined in the original convention. The Second Protocol attempted to
clarify this vagueness and stated that it applied to armed conflicts of an international character
and to conflicts not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the
19
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Parties. 24 However, it is clear from various commentaries on Article Twenty-Two of the Second
Protocol that the Hague and the Protocols did not apply to “situations of internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature.” 25 Commentators agree that this article, and Article Nineteen of the Hague Convention,
do not extend to situations such as riots; however, it can be assumed that mostly civil war type
situations are covered in the provisions dealing with armed conflicts not of an international
nature. 26 Furthermore, by the virtue of the Hague Convention and the two Protocols being
mostly war time treaties, with limited peace time application, peace time destruction by the
government of its own a state are not covered under the subsequent Protocols or the original
Convention.
C. 1970 UNE SCO Convention
Like the Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention also contains several treaties that
protect cultural property both during times of peace and war. 27 There are three primary articles
that deal with cultural property during wartime. The first provision is Article Eleven, which
expands Part I of the First Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954. Article Eleven makes the
export and transfer of ownership of cultural property under coercion arising due to occupation
by foreign states “illicit” or unlawful. 28 The next provision, Article Seven, is in effect during
wartime, as well as during peacetime, and requires members to make certain that museums in
their jurisdiction are not acquiring illegally exported cultural objects from war torn areas. It
further obligates states to provide assistance to other contracting members by facilitating the

24
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return of illicitly exported objects. 29 Article Nine of the UNESCO Convention is another
provision that has utility during times of conflict because it gives contracting members the right
to call for assistance from other contracting states if they feel that their “cultural patrimony” is
in jeopardy from pillage. 30 While this provision does not specifically mention conflict
situations, circumstances arising from internal or international conflict would be one obvious
circumstance where the pillaging of archeological sites and ethological sites would be likely to
occur. 31 The article obligates contracting members to assist only if another contracting member
has requested such assistance. Therefore, Article Nine is of no particular use where the
contracting state has not requested such assistance, and is responsible for the pillaging.
The one major limitation of the UNESCO Convention as a whole is, as the name
suggests, it is limited to dealing with movement of cultural property. In other words, the
UNESCO Convention primarily deals with movable cultural property, and not monuments and
structures that are often the target of hostility during cultural conflicts. Unlike Article One of the
Hague, Article One of the UNESCO Convention does not mention immovable cultural property,
and mostly deals with things such as archaeological objects, antiquities, art, historical
manuscripts, etc. 32 This narrow focus on movable cultural property is appropriate in the context
of the UNESCO Convention because this convention is mainly concerned with the import and
export of cultural property obtained through illegal means. The UNESCO Convention, as the
name suggests, is an import-export based treaty, focusing on primarily the illicit movement of
cultural objects. It is not effective, or even applicable, in protecting actual monuments like
ancient temples, a cliff face statute, or an ancient city. For this reason, the UNESCO convention
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cannot be considered a major vehicle for the protection of cultural monuments and is removed
from the following discussion.
D. World Heritage Convention
Immovable cultural property, such as religious buildings, palaces, castles, and other
landmarks, would be prime targets during cultural, or religious, conflicts. The Hague
Convention of 1954 and the World Heritage Conventions are really the only major treaties that
provide protections for immovable cultural property. The World Heritage Convention provides
for the designation of sites of preeminent world importance as World Heritage Sites. 33 Article
Eleven of the Convention requires parties to submit to the World Heritage Committee,
established by the Convention, an inventory of cultural property situated in their territory which
would be suitable for inclusion in the World Heritage List. 34
Other noteworthy parts of the World Heritage Convention deal with more generalized
duties and obligations, rather than specifically addressing the issue of protection of cultural
property during times of conflict. 35 Article Four creates a “general duty on States Parties to
identify, protect, conserve and transmit to future generations the cultural and natural heritage
situated in its territory.” 36Article Six creates an obligation to refrain from deliberately taking
measures that may damage directly, or indirectly, cultural property situated on the territory of
another party member. 37 Originally, Article Six was explicitly meant to apply during wartimes,
however, it no longer does so, and most states are still governed by their obligations under the
Hague Convention of 1954 during times of armed conflict. 38 Although the World Heritage
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Convention is ambiguous as to its application in times of armed conflict, the use of the World
Heritage List by UNESCO to protect sites in Dubrovnik, during the civil war there, established
its limited usefulness in times of armed conflict.
The treaties mentioned above, however, seems to have little or no effect in cases like the
Babri Mosque Riots in India, or the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, as
usually they are treaties that deal with armed conflict of international nature -- wars. These two
incidents provide perfect examples of why a human rights based approach to protection of
cultural heritage is more appropriate than one couched in the post-world war II internationalism.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Destruction of the Babri Mosque
For many Indians, history and mythology blend to create a heightened sense of
possessiveness towards old structures, statutes, and sites, depicting the mythological past of
India. In a nation where there is a Hindu past, an Islamic past, and an historical past, conflicts
between the two religious groups sharing a tenuous peace are inevitable. The issue of the Babri
Mosque in the holy city of Ayodhya was fodder for dissension between the Hindu and Muslim
fundamentalists looking to shape the image of India in their particular culture rather than the
diverse secular nation it is.
B.B. Lal, an archaeologist who was very much a product of the historically mythical
Hindu culture, worked to determine the historicity of the two Hindu epics of Mahabharata and
Ramayana. 39 In 1975, he began excavating Ayodhya City, which is famed as the birthplace of a
major Hindu god. 40 The excavations continued till 1986, and a full report was submitted in
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1993. 41 The real controversy regarding this site began with a discovery made early on in the
excavations. 42 While the excavation as a whole failed to provide any substantial evidence to the
claim of a flourishing civilization in which Hindu gods and goddesses were born on earth, it did
provide one archeological find on which Hindu fundamentalists renewed the ongoing feud with
the Muslim population of India. 43 Next to the mosque, fourteen pillars depicting Hindu carvings
were discovered. Stone slabs with carvings discussing a Hindu temple were also discovered on
the site embedded into the Mosque walls. 44 This discovery led to claims that the Muslim
invaders had destroyed a previously existing Hindu temple to build the Babri Mosque, and thus
the land rightfully belonged to the Hindus.
The Babri Mosque was an important structure not only for Islamic, religious, purposes,
but also for historical and architectural reasons. 45 It provided insight in to early Mughal
architecture in northeastern India. An annotation by a translator of the Baburnama, the
autobiography of the first Mughal Emperor, Babur, 46 provides some limited information as to
the creation of the Mosque. 47 In 935 A.D., a man called Mir-Baqi commissioned the the Mosque
in honor of Babur. 48 His memoirs made no mention of a previous Hindu temple erected on that
site, nor are there any discussions about the demolition of old structures before the construction
of the Mosque. 49 The only mention of a Hindu temple being on site is found in a column in the
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Faziabad Gazetter at the turn of the twentieth century. 50 Mrs. Beveridge, a columnist for the
Gazetter, amended her annotations to the autobiography to include the notation that the mosque
was built on a Hindu site, and further added her own assumption that the temple was dedicated
to the major Hindu god Rama. 51 Furthermore, there was no textual evidence to support this
assertion in any of the ancient Hindu texts discussing pilgrimage sites and temples in Ganges
planes. 52 Indeed, many scholars speculate that Ayodhya rose to the level of a major pilgrimage
site rather late in Indian history. 53
For purposes of fundamentalist politics, the assertion that Ayodhya was not a major
pilgrimage site historically provided a perfect opportunity to incite the Indian public in the name
of religion. 54 On December 6, 1992, the Kar Sevaks, a group consisting of thousands of Hindu
fundamentalists, destroyed the Babri Masjid. 55 This was the culmination of several years of
political campaigns by Hindu Nationalist leaders calling for the rebuilding of a Hindu temple on
the site of the mosque. 56 In the time leading up to this event, some 151 people had died
nationwide. 57 The army had been called in to control the riots, and a curfew in towns and cities
was commonplace. 58 These events were merely a small preview of the violence and mayhem yet
to come. 59 Two days after the razing of the mosque violence had spread across the nation and
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230 more people had died in the resulting riots. 60 By December 12, 1992, six days later, the
death toll had risen to 950. 61 By the time the dispute was under control and the riots had
dissipated, some 2000 people had died due to the violence. 62
B. The demolition of the Bamiyan Buddhas
Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan was part of the “pan-continental Buddhist culture that
stretched from west Central Asia to China, lasting in Afghanistan until the early eleventh
century when Central Asia was overrun by Islamic tribes and the long-standing commercial
routes to western China were severed.” 63 Bamiyan Valley was home to some of the most
impressive statues of the Shakyamuni Buddha, known now as the Bamiyan Buddhas, which
dated back to the early part of the seventh century. 64 Starting in 1222, with the invasion of
Ghengis Khan, the statues suffered mass damage at the hands of invaders and settlers. 65
The Bamiyan Buddhas were highly important to the documentation of Central Asian
material culture, the migration of culture along the silk route, and the subsequent non-Islamic
cultures of Afghanistan and surrounding areas. 66 The Buddhas were a central place of worship
during pre-Islamic Afghanistan. 67 After the Taliban’s victory over the ruling class in the mid1900s, Afghanistan’s systematic transition into a fundamentalist, orthodox, Islamic State began.
On February 26, 2001, Mullah Mohammed Omar (“Mullah Omar”), the leader of the Taliban,
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issued an edict to destroy all statues, proclaiming them to be idolatrous. 68 Although Mullah
Omar claimed statues to be against “Islamic order,” Egyptian Fahmi Howeidy, a major expert of
Islamic religion, stated that it was the Taliban’s edict that was contrary to Islam, because “Islam
[is a religion that] respects other cultures even if they include rituals that are against Islamic
law.” 69
This decision came as a shock to the international community because Mullah Omar had
declared early in the Taliban’s reign that the Bamiyan Buddhas were rare ancient monuments. 70
He had previously reasoned that since there were no practicing Buddhists in Afghanistan, the
statues were excluded from the Taliban’s campaign against idolatry. 71 The Taliban by this time
had already caved under the pressure of the even more radical al-Qaeda and the clerics and
militants that gathered around them. 72 “It was claimed,” says Bevan in his account of the
destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan Valley, “that the pressure to destroy the statues came
after lobbying from the foreign militants gathered around al-Qaeda, supported by Islamic clerics
in Saudi Arabia who, it has been argued, are resistant to the incorporation of items of material
culture under Islamic control into universal notions of art-historical value.” 73 Soon, thereafter, a
rapid destruction of statues began. On March 3, 2001, the international press reported that the
destruction of the two main Buddha statues had begun, and it continued for two days.. 74 Nations
across the world made pleas with the Afghan government to spare the statues, or to sell them so
they could exist in their entirety in other parts of the world where the unique beauty and
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religious value of the Shakyamuni was better understood. 75 The pleas fell on deaf ears.
“[D]espite the difficulties met by Afghan troops in destroying the solid rock carved statues, the
Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, confirmed on 6 March, 2001 that destruction of all statues,
including the two Buddhas, was being completed.” 76
IV. LOOPHOLES: INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATIES
Out of the two examples discussed above, the Babri Mosque scenario better exemplifies
why international treaties did not work.. 77 The Babri Mosque example clearly falls within the
more obvious loopholes of the Hague Convention and the World Heritage Convention, both of
which India is a party to In the Hague Convention the situation that climaxed with the
destruction of the Babri Mosque can in no way be defined as a civil war. The destruction of the
Mosque was a result of internal political strife surrounded by riots. Article Twenty-Two of the
Second Protocol would not cover this situation, as there was no “armed conflict,” or even a nonarmed conflict, of any sort until after the Mosque was razed. 78 No other nations were involved,
and even the Indian government was somewhat detached from the entire incident. Furthermore,
the obligations imposed by the Hague Convention to protect cultural monuments during peace
time only extend to the preparation for safeguarding against harm to cultural property against
foreseeable effects of an armed conflict. 79 While it can be argued that the Indian government
could have foreseen the civil strife and therefore taken steps to protect the Babri Mosque, that
supposition can be countered by the argument that the Indian government did not anticipate an
75
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armed conflict within the scope of the Hague Convention, and thus was not under any obligation
to take measures to protect the Mosque. The ambiguity about the scope of the Hague
Convention leads to multiple interpretations, which create a loophole through which a nation
can escape its obligation to protect cultural property from harm.
The ambiguity concerning the scope of the Hague Convention similarly arises within the
World Heritage Convention. India is also a party to the World Heritage Convention and is
generally obligated to identify, protect, conserve and transmit to future generations the cultural
and natural heritage situated in its territory. 80 As mentioned in the Hague Convention context,
this obligation is extremely vague and does not create a duty that can be enforced through
sanctions or other means. As long as some attempt has been made to oblige this general mandate
of the treaty, a State’s obligations can be considered fulfilled. Concerning the other obligations
imposed by the World Heritage Convention, the language of the Convention requires that a state
upkeep and protect structures and natural areas if the committee agrees that they are world
heritage caliber. 81 The weaknesses of the World Heritage Convention can be succinctly
described as follows: rights granted by the Convention are held by individual states, which
means that only member states have “discretion when deciding which of their territorial sites
will be placed on the World Heritage List and which objects are worthy of assistance.” 82 Thus,
the World Heritage Convention provides great power to the states, and as discussed later in the
Bamiyan context, enforcement by governing bodies and the international community is lax.
The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas provides a slightly harder problem. Even if
80
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Afghanistan was a party to the Hague Convention of 1954 and its Protocols, which it is not, its
applicability to the Buddha situation is questionable. One major reason for the ambiguity
surrounding the Hague Convention’s effectiveness is that: “[a]lthough the Convention provides
a useful framework for protecting cultural property, it is futile when one party intentionally
destroys cultural property or identity. The 1954 Hague Convention’s premise is that threats to
cultural property come from external parties, not the controlling state.” 83 The 1954 Hague
Convention is further inapplicable in the Buddha’s situation “because the Bamiyan Valley was
free of hostilities and securely under the Taliban's control” when the Buddhas were destroyed. 84
The Buddhas were not harmed in the fighting, and thus their destruction falls within the realm of
willful peacetime, rather than wartime, destruction.
The World Heritage Convention provides more of a substantive analysis because
Afghanistan is a party to it, and if Taliban can be seen as a legitimate government, they acceded
to the Convention. 85 As mentioned above, the World Heritage Convention places a lot of power
in the hands of the member states because it is the member states that determine which of their
sites are eligible for the list . 86 The situation in Afghanistan is unique because the Buddhas were
not placed on the World Heritage List until two years after their destruction at the hands of
Taliban. 87 However, the general duty to identify, protect, conserve and transmit to future
generations the cultural and natural heritage situated in its territory could have created an
obligation on the Afghan government. 88 This general obligation seems to create a duty to protect
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cultural property even when it is not on the World Heritage List. 89 Taliban's deliberate
destruction of the Buddhas could be considered a breach of Afghanistan's general duty to protect
its cultural property. 90 Ultimately, several commentators agree that there was sufficient legal
basis to sanction the Afghan government under the World Heritage Convention. 91 Sanctions,
such as suspension of technical assistance or withdrawal of financial aid, could have been
adopted against Afghanistan. 92 As we know, in the aftermath of the destruction no states, nor
UNESCO, took any measures against Afghanistan. 93 The international community’s apathy
shows that both of these Conventions are mostly “toothless” treaties which really only provide
protections in extremely limited circumstances. 94
V.NEW PHILOSOPHY, NEW LAW
The conditions and ideologies that gave birth to the Hague Convention of 1954 are just
as important as the document itself. The Hague Convention was a direct result of the loss of life
and property experienced by the international community during World War II. 95 The preamble
to the Hague Convention sets out the philosophy that the drafters sought to encapsulate through
the treaty provisions. 96 The preamble states in relevant part: “Being convinced that damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of
all humankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.” 97 Cultural
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internationalism, or the idea that “there is a legally cognizable international interest in cultural
property,” 98 is an idea that works best in an international context, where two or more states are
engaged in armed conflict.
On the other side of this discourse is what Merryman defines as the “source nation
discourse.” 99 The 1970 UNESCO Convention best embodies and supports this school of
thought. 100 The source nation discourse focuses on the relationship between cultural objects and
the national history, culture, and identity of a state. 101 To exhibit this perspective, the UNESCO
Convention employs terminology like “cultural patrimony,” “cultural heritage,” and
“protection.” 102 Source nation discourse has one inherent flaw; what makes up the cultural
heritage and identity of a particular nation is defined by the state, most often by the controlling
government.
While source nation discourse goes a long way in connecting a nation’s interest with the
cultural object, it also has the negative effect of connecting national identity with a cultural
object. 103 This could result in the situations discussed above -- destruction of the remains of a
Buddhist past of an Islamic nation and apathy toward the destruction of an Islamic structure in a
nation striving to establish a Hindu identity. The weak points mentioned above stem from the
approaches that the Conventions seek to embody, and to a certain degree, the focus of
international law on state to state relationships. To have an effective system of cultural property
protection it is necessary that individuals be held liable for actions that violate international law,
rather than simply relying on states to create domestic law criminalizing the destruction of

98

Merryman, supra note 94, at 11.
Id. at 12
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
See generally Merryman, supra note 94.
99

20

cultural property. 104 Simply put, there needs to be direct responsibility to the international
community.
The human rights regime is one of the mechanisms that has proven to be extremely
effective in creating individual responsibility directly to the international. One example of a
successful human rights regime is the Statute of the International Tribunal of the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), which was created by the United Nations Security Council after the end
of the Balkan hostilities in the 1990s. 105 The ICTY tribunal was created for “the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law.” 106 The ICTY has jurisdiction to
prosecute persons for “violations of the laws and customs of war and crimes against
Humanity.” 107 For example, the ICTY found three men guilty of crimes against humanity after
they had deliberately attacked ancient mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that case the ICTY
found that because the destruction was committed with discriminatory intent it amounted to an
attack on a people’s religious identity, and thus constituted a crime against humanity. 108 “The
ICTY blurs the distinction between crimes against people and crimes against property,
ultimately stating that such crimes may violate human rights. This precedent will be enormously
helpful in advancing the law in this area.” 109
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The ICTY approach would work best in the Babri Mosque context. The creation of an
ICTY -type statute that creates a human rights interest in the protection of cultural and religious
objects would be the best path to fixing the loopholes in the Hague Convention and the World
Heritage Convention left by with the absence of a scheme to deal with conflicts that do not rise
to the level of a civil war. By creating individual responsibility, political leaders working behind
the scenes to create political and civil disorder and incite riots would be held personally liable
under criminal charges for the destruction of cultural property. Such a statute would create an
incentive for local leaders to ensure that their actions do not lead to the destruction of cultural
sites as it did in the Babri Mosque incident.
This approach, however, would not easily transfer to the Bamiyan Buddha example. It
was easier to see the human rights violation in the Babri Mosque riots, as the Hindu majority
destroyed a religious symbol of a large minority in India and mostly Muslims were killed in the
riots preceding and following the razing of the Mosque. 110 It is more difficult to see the human
rights violation in the destruction of Bamiyan Buddhas. Reportedly, at the time of the
destruction of the Buddhas there were no practicing Buddhists in Afghanistan. 111 The only way
that this would constitute as a human rights violation is if the actions of the Taliban could be
considered a human rights affront to Buddhists in other nations, or even more broadly to any
other religion that conflicts with Islam on a regular basis. The Human Rights approach
discussed above is the most appropriate approach in the present state of the world where it can
never be forgotten that, “[s]tates are certainly capable of violating the human rights of their own
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people,” and certainly they could be capable of violating the human rights of nationals of other
states. 112
Wangkeo defines the cultural protection regime in the human rights context as follows:
In order for a cultural object to be protected . . . , it would have to fulfill two
conditions: (1) it must be constitutive of a group's identity; and (2) it must not be
symbolic of repugnant values in international law. In order for a state's destructive
conduct to be objectionable, it would also have to satisfy two criteria: (1) it would
indeed have to constitute iconoclasm (the destruction of the relic in order to
eradicate its symbolic power) . . . ; and (2) the act would have to be antagonistic to
international law, violating human rights standards or flouting international norms
of conduct, for example. 113
In the Bamiyan Buddhas context, the criteria laid out by Wangkeo are met. The giant
Buddhas symbolized the Buddhist identity in Asia, both religiously and historically, and they
did not represent views that were repugnant to international law ideals. Thus, the first prong is
satisfied, and the cultural object is falls within a class of objects that need protection. The
second prong is also satisfied because the actions of the Taliban constituted iconoclasm, i.e. the
statues were destroyed to obliterate the symbolic value they held in Afghanistan as a symbol of
a non-Islamic past -- and the destruction of the statutes was antagonistic to international law. In
such circumstances, even though there was not a group of people directly affected by the
destruction in Afghanistan, the human rights regime could reach the people responsible for the
destruction of the statues. While the system proposed by Wangkeo might not provide a perfect
regime, it certainly closes up the loopholes that allowed situations like the Bamiyan Buddha to
occur.
VI.CONCLUSION
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Ultimately, under the system discussed above, combined with the creation of a special tribunal
such as the ICTY discussed above, a regime could be created where individuals are obligated
not to violate the human rights of any other individual. It is time that the current cultural
property regime is reevaluated, as the old definition of armed conflict, i.e. state-to-state conflict,
is not applicable. Cultural wars are the norm of today, and when cultural property is directly
targeted, and targeted for the reason of cultural cleansing, the treaties need to focus on a human
rights based approach to the protection of such cultural property.
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